

Message Text

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42

ACTION OES-05

INFO OCT-01 ARA-06 EUR-12 IO-11 ISO-00 INRE-00 ACDA-05

CIAE-00 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 EB-07 NRC-05

FEAE-00 DODE-00 SS-15 SSO-00 NSCE-00 ACDE-00 PM-04

NEA-10 /096 W

----- 119616

O 171730Z FEB 76

FM USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7086

INFO USERDA GERMANTOWN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATZ

AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE

USMISSION BERLIN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BRASILIAH IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L IAEA VIENNA 1212

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: AORG, OCON, IAEA, TECH, PARM, UR, BR, GW

SUBJECT: FRG/IAEA BRAZIL TRILATERAL SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT

PASS IO/SCT

OES FOR BENGELSDORF

REF: IAEA VIENNA 1168

SUMMARY: DURING COURSE OF COURTESY CALL ON HIM FEB. 16

BY AMBASSADORS TAPE AND STONE, SOVIET RESREP

(EROFEEV) AGAIN EXPLAINED SOVIET CONCERNS WITH

SUBJECT AGREEMENT AND MADE IT CLEAR THAT

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SOVIETS WOULD ATTEMPT HAVE IT POSTPONED FOR CONSID-
ERATION BY JUNE BOARD, NOT RPT NOT FOR A SPECIAL

BOARD WHICH COULD MEET EARLIER. END SUMMARY.

1. EROFEEV OBSERVED THAT USSR ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THIS AGREEMENT, SINCE IT WAS THE FIRST TO BE CONSIDERED AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THE LONDON GUIDELINES. AS IT NOW STOOD, A NUMBER OF PROVISIONS IN THE AGREEMENT WERE UNACCEPTABLE AND IN VIEW OF THE PRECEDENT THE AGREEMENT CONSTITUTED, ITS CONSIDERATION BY THE BOARD SHOULD BE POSTPONED "AT LEAST" UNTIL JUNE IN THE INTEREST OF NON-PROLIFERATION. EROFEEV REPEATED SOVIET CONCERNS REGARDING "INCONSISTENCY" BETWEEN TRILATERAL AND INFCIRC 66/REV. 2 QUESTION OF SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT/FACILITIES AND REGARDING THE 20 YEAR PERIOD SPECIFIED IN ARTICLE 3.2. HOWEVER, HE DID NOT REFER TO URANIUM ENRICHMENT, NOR WAS ANY MENTION MADE OF WEST BERLIN PROBLEM.

2. NEW ELEMENT OF CONCERN INTRODUCED BY SOVIET REPRESENTATION WAS ARTICLE 29. WITH THE EURATOM SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT NOT YET IN FORCE, HE SAID, ARTICLE 29 WOULD

PERMIT FRG TO IMPORT NUCLEAR MATERIALS FROM BRAZIL WHICH WERE NOT SUBJECT TO SAFEGUARDS UNDER NPT AGREEMENT.

MENT.

3. I ASKED EROFEEV IF THEIR CONCERNS COULD BE MET BY IMPROVEMENT IN TEXT WHICH COULD BE UNDERTAKEN AT THIS MEETING OF THE BG OR BY A REDRAFTING EFFORT WHICH MIGHT BE PRESENTED TO A SPECIAL BOARD IN A FEW WEEKS OR, ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THEIR CONCERNS WERE BASIC IN NATURE; E.G., IF THE SOVIETS WERE TO INSIST THAT THE EURATOM AGREEMENT CAME INTO FORCE BEFORE THE FRG/BRAZIL TRILATERAL. HE REPLIED THAT REDRAFTING EFFORT SHOULD NOT BE UNDERTAKEN BY BOARD, WHICH INCLUDED MANY GOVERNORS WHOSE GOVERNMENTS WERE CONFIDENTIAL
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NOT REPRESENTED IN LONDON SUPPLIERS TALKS BUT BY SECRETARIAT WHOSE EFFORTS COULD BE INFLUENCED IN DIRECTION OF LONDON GUIDELINES. CONSIDERING IMPORTANCE OF THIS AGREEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GUIDELINES, JUNE WAS NOT TOO LONG TO WAIT.

4. COMMENT: NONE OF THE OBJECTIONS RAISED BY THE SOVIETS THUS FAR, EITHER INDIVIDUALLY OR COLLECTIVELY, WOULD APPEAR TO WARRANT THE STRONG POSITION BEING TAKEN BY THEM. OBJECTION TO ARTICLE 29 MAY WELL BE

AN ATTEMPT BY SOVIET TO COMPEL EURATOM PARTIES TO
BRING IAEA/EURATOM SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT INTO
FORCE AT AN EARLY DATE. THERE MAY, HOWEVER, BE
OTHER MORE SERIOUS PROBLEMS OF WHICH WE ARE AS YET
UNAWARE. END COMMENT.

5. RE FRANCE/IAEA/PAKISTAN SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT,
WHICH SECRETARIAT HAD DISTRIBUTED THAT DAY, EROFEEV
NOTED THAT HE HE HAD NOT STUDIED TEXT IN DETAIL BUT
THAT FRENCH AND PAKISTANI WERE IN TOO MUCH OF HURRY,
THAT ONLY A WEEK REMAINED FOR MEMBER STATES TO STUDY
IT BEFORE BOARD AND THAT IT TOO SHOULD BE POSTPONED.

6. OTHER TOPICS DISCUSSED BEING REPORTED SEPTTEL. TAPE

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